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Abstract: When startup innovation involves a potentially disruptive technology – 
initially lagging in the predominant performance metric, but with a potentially favorable 
trajectory of improvement – incumbents may be wary of engaging in cooperative 
commercialization with the startup. While the prevailing theory of disruptive innovation 
suggests that this will lead to (exclusively) competitive commercialization and the 
eventual replacement of incumbents, we consider a dynamic strategy involving product 
market entry before switching to a cooperative commercialization strategy. Empirical 
evidence from the automated speech recognition industry from 1952-2010 confirms our 
main hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize their technical innovations often rely on cooperative 
strategies, such as technology licensing, with other organizations. They do so both to access the skills or 
assets they may not possess and to minimize competitive effects. Given that the decision to cooperate 
with incumbents is not unilateral, the incumbent must see some advantage in accessing the technology 
from the innovator. But if the incumbent is unsure about the value of the technology, cooperation may be 
initially infeasible. Thus the entrant may find it necessary to compete in the product market, at least until 
the incumbent becomes convinced regarding the value of the technology. 
Consider the case of Qualcomm’s code-division multiple access (CDMA) technology for 
handling cellular communications. CDMA took the controversial approach of handling multiple calls on 
the same frequency simultaneously and managing the interference as opposed to sequentially as in the 
prevailing protocol, TDMA (time-division multiple access). Although CDMA promised to be more 
efficient than TDMA, there were many skeptics including a Stanford University professor who declared 
that the frequency-sharing approach would “violate the laws of physics” (Brodsky 2008: 199) and 
accused Qualcomm of faking its first demonstration. Qualcomm temporarily abandoned licensing and 
began manufacturing both base stations and handsets in order to prove the value of CDMA technology. It 
retained these complementary businesses for several years before selling the former to Ericsson and the 
latter to Kyocera. In personal communication, Qualcomm co-founder Andrew Viterbi (2012) recounted: 
[F]or this large and complex opportunity it was essential to produce the 
infrastructure as well as the handsets…it was necessary to convince the 
carriers that CDMA was indeed a workable technology which had a major 
advantage over alternates: GSM, U.S. and Japanese TDMA standards. All of 
this took a lot of effort, several successful demonstrations, some luck and about 
three or four years; there were many skeptics.” 
Qualcomm’s strategy of temporarily entering the product market and subsequently switching to its 
preferred licensing model serves as an example of how firms can demonstrate the value of their 
technology to would-be partners.  
One category of innovations that may be particularly difficult to commercialize in a cooperative 
setup are “disruptive” technologies. Disruptive technologies exhibit an initially worse performance profile 
on the dimension valued by mainstream consumers (e.g., OECD, 1967; Foster, 1986; Christensen, 1997), 
so the gains to trade with incumbents required for cooperative commercialization may not exist. If 
deployed, however, they may exhibit a favorable trajectory of improvement. Under such a circumstance, 
the commercialization partner may have little financial incentive early on to develop the innovation in-
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367836 
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house or access it via contractual means, as combining it with their existing activities is costly. However, 
should a potentially disruptive technology prove to be valuable, these incentives may change. Thus, in 
contrast to the main predictions of existing analyses that find incumbent firm market leadership routinely 
replaced in the face of disruptive innovation by entrepreneurs, cooperative commercialization—which 
preserves incumbent market leadership—may still be a long-term outcome.  
We explore a two-stage commercialization strategy in which a start-up entrant temporarily enters 
the product market in order to establish the value of its technology. Ultimately, the entrant may switch to 
a strategy of cooperating with incumbents once uncertainty over the disruptive technology is resolved 
and/or the incumbent’s costs of integrating the new technology declines. This dynamic technology 
commercialization strategy (TCS) extends extant frameworks linking the environmental, organizational, 
and competitive factors to an entrant’s initial choice of TCS (Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003). Such 
work characterizes TCS as a one-time, static decision to cooperate with incumbents via licensing or to 
compete against them in the product market.  
Perhaps one reason commercialization strategy has not been explored dynamically is the 
difficulty of obtaining longitudinal data regarding TCS adoption and evolution. We introduce a hand-
collected dataset tracking all entrants into the automatic speech recognition (ASR) industry from its 
inception in 1952 through the end of 2010. ASR is an attractive industry for TCS analysis because its 
commercialization environment leaves open a variety of possible strategies. The data allow us to follow 
technology commercialization strategies on an annual basis, including when firms change from their 
initial TCS. Furthermore, our long time horizon of observing industry entrants allows us to study the 
relationship between innovation characteristics (e.g., disruptive technology status) and their 
commercialization strategies.  
Our analysis reveals that ASR entrants who introduce disruptive technologies are more likely to 
adopt a two-stage commercialization strategy in which they initially compete with incumbents but later 
cooperate with them. This result calls into question the notion that disruptive technologies necessarily 
result in the demise of incumbents, such as in the disk-drive industry (Christensen, 1997). Although the 
initially unattractive nature of disruptive technologies does entail first stage entrant/incumbent 
competition, cooperation may ultimately ensue in commercialization environments where it is supported.   
2 Theory and Main Hypothesis 
The literature on commercialization strategy has focused on the entrant choice between 
competing or cooperating with incumbents (Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003). The empirical 
investigation of those choices has sought to correlate them with characteristics of the market environment, 
including competition (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001), access to complementary assets (Gans, 
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Hsu and Stern, 2002), frictions (Hsu, 2006 and Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2013) and the strength of 
intellectual property protection. Here, we instead consider how different technology types within an 
industry correlate with commercialization choices. In addition, we examine changes in commercialization 
strategy throughout the life of an entrepreneurial firm, thereby moving away from the static, one-time 
choice that has been the hallmark of the TCS literature to date. 
2.1 How does technology innovation type impact commercialization choice? 
There have been many classifications of technology that have been used to inform strategic 
management. Here we focus on those that have been argued to impact the nature of the commercialization 
choice for entrants between competing and cooperating. To date, the literature on commercialization 
strategy has emphasized the costs the entrant’s face in competitive entry. In the predominate static TCS 
framework (Teece, 1986; Gans and Stern, 2003), the lower the cost of product market entry, including the 
costs of assembling the requisite downstream complementary assets for commercialization, the more 
attractive is a competitive commercialization strategy. This is especially true if the appropriability regime 
is weak so that the entrant’s exposure to disclosure risks when bargaining over deal terms with industry 
incumbents is high. 
By contrast, the literature on the direction of innovation in an industry has started with the 
organizational effect of such innovations on incumbents. Tushman and Anderson (1986) classify 
innovations into those that are competence-destroying (requiring new organizational skills to successfully 
commercialize) and competence-enhancing (those that build on existing organizational know-how). 
Across a variety of industrial settings, researchers have found that competence-destroying innovations are 
more likely to be initiated by new entrants, whereas industry incumbents tend to originate competence-
enhancing discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Christensen and Bower, 1996). This pattern 
reflects the behavior of established firms, which are typically eager to invest and support innovations that 
sustain and extend rates of improvement along the dimensions demanded by their mainstream consumers.  
While entrants constrained to choose cooperative commercialization paths may themselves pursue a 
competence-enhancing innovation, they have strong incentives to originate competence-destroying 
innovations as they do not fear product cannibalization and typically do not have vested positions in a 
pre-existing complementary asset infrastructure.  
From this perspective, the incumbent’s costs of integrating new technology will impact the 
surplus that can be generated from cooperative commercialization with an entrant’s technology. If those 
integration costs were high with regard to incumbent market repositioning and complementary asset 
reorientation (as would be the case under competence-destroying innovation), cooperative arrangements 
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would be less likely to take place. By contrast, if those costs were low, there would be no incumbent-side 
barrier to integration, and cooperative commercialization would be favored.1 
In an influential line of research, Christensen and his co-authors describe a set of technologies 
which are, initially, less compatible with incumbent products and processes. This is because they perform 
poorly on dimensions that are currently valued by the majority of consumers in the market. These 
represent a good example of technologies that would be costly for incumbents to integrate into their 
existing product lines. Thus, we will use in our empirical work this metric as a proxy for technologies that 
have high initial costs of integration and could be a technological driver of the choice between 
competition and cooperation.  
2.2 What drives changes in commercialization choice by entrants? 
The static TCS literature assumes that commercialization is a one-time choice for the entrant. 
However, it is both conceptually and in reality possible that having chosen one commercialization path, 
an entrant may subsequently switch to another. Building a dynamic theory of commercialization choice 
involves considering what changes might occur after an entrant’s initial commercialization choice and, 
importantly, the changes that will occur because of the choice (Gans, 2012). 
The Christensen line of research describes a class of technologies called “disruptive 
technologies.” As already noted, such technologies poorly serve the existing customers of incumbents in 
key dimensions. But, importantly, what gives them their disruptive power is that this underperformance is 
eroded over time and in the long run, such technologies may outperform existing technologies along all 
dimensions. For example, Christensen and Bower (1996) show that the lower capacity, slow access speed, 
and high cost of 5.25-inch disk drives compared to existing 8-inch drives led to their rejection by 
minicomputer OEMs. By contrast, “sustaining” technologies would improve capacity and access speed. 
Thus, the 5.25 drive was not attractive to incumbents. However, the 5.25 drive had a path of improvement 
along those traditional metrics and their use cases became better understood over time. Consequently, 
small drives came to dominate the market.  
What are the drivers and implications of an enlarged choice-set in which an entrant may alter its 
initial commercialization strategy? The first issue is generic uncertainty regarding the innovation’s future 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1 There are likely to be heterogeneous incumbent firm responses in the face of radical technologies, however. 
Mitchell (1989) finds that the degree of industry rivalry and prior organizational investments in specialized assets 
shape the likelihood an timing of incumbent firm entry in emerging subfields of medical imaging technologies. King 
and Tucci (2002) document that in the hard disk drive industry, market entry in the face of radical technical change 
depends on firms’ production and sales experience (and so is not simply a function of demand-side forces). More 
generally, Iansiti (2000) provides evidence that both evolutionary and revolutionary responses by firms in navigating 
technological transitions can achieve comparable performance, and so there is not necessarily a “best response” 
strategy by incumbents to technical transitions. Evolutionary and revolutionary response strategies each have 
different precursors for use along the dimensions of experimentation and project versus research experience. 
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value. For example, it may be profitable for an incumbent to incur the costs of integrating a technology 
and improving it in-house if the incumbent were assured of the innovation’s future value. But if there is 
uncertainty in that regard, the incumbent may be reluctant to cooperate initially.2 The second issue is what 
happens to the incumbent’s cost of integration over time. If the incumbent chooses to cooperate initially, 
those costs are incurred and then sunk, and so they are irrelevant from the perspective of subsequent 
decisions. However, in situations where the technology is disruptive, one expects that following market 
tests, a technology may improve along all dimensions, including those that the incumbent’s customers 
value. If such an improvement was anticipated, an incumbent may prefer to wait before engaging in 
cooperation. For disruptive innovations, we may therefore observe competition initially followed by 
cooperation at a later stage. 
The interplay between uncertainty and expectations regarding future integration costs for 
incumbents is complex. In the appendix, we provide a dynamic model of commercialization that formally 
investigates these effects, taking into account the fact that commercialization strategy is not a choice of 
the entrant per se but is the outcome of a negotiation between the entrant and incumbent. In this case, 
because that negotiation may take place both in the present and potentially in the future, examining the 
equilibrium outcomes is not trivial.  
The model confirms the intuition expressed here. It demonstrates that the more uncertain is the 
future value of the entrant’s innovation in the market place, the more likely the entrant will undertake 
competitive commercialization initially. However, the model also demonstrates that a switch in 
commercialization strategy from competition to cooperation does not depend on that uncertainty even if it 
depends on its resolution. Instead, switching strategy depends upon the realized changes in the 
incumbent’s cost of integration. If these are large and the entrant’s innovation turns out to be valuable in 
the marketplace, a switch will occur. In the empirics, innovations that turn out not to be valuable may be 
short-lived, and so we are more likely to observe changes in commercialization strategy for long-lived 
innovations. We predict that an observed switch from competition to cooperation will be associated with 
technologies that initially underperform but have a strong path of improvement along traditional metrics; 
that is, “disruptive technologies.” For such technologies we may see entrepreneurs switch their 
commercialization strategy. That is, competition may precede cooperative commercialization strategies 
(e.g., licensing or acquisition), as was the case with Qualcomm. By contrast, innovations that perform 
well initially and/or do not have a strong path of improvement along those metrics (i.e., sustaining 
technologies) will not be associated with switches in commercialization choice. Thus, our hypothesis is: 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
2 Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001: 430) allude to this possibility in a footnote: “…[s]ometimes self-
production is a necessary condition for successful licensing. For instance, self-production could help assess the true 
value of the technology or could help identify potential bottlenecks in technology transfer.” 
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Disruptive technologies will be associated with a higher level of competition initially followed by a switch 
to cooperation (either licensing, acquisition or both). 
It is useful to stress here that when there is uncertainty over an innovation’s value, there are two 
paths to a market test to resolve that uncertainty. First, the incumbent could license or integrate the 
technology into their own products and test it in the market. Second, the entrants could enter the market 
themselves and test the innovation’s value. When the incumbent and entrant negotiate initially over 
cooperation versus commercialization they are, in effect, choosing who would be more efficient in 
conducting that market test. For technologies that are competence-destroying or disruptive in the sense 
that they underperform on traditional metrics, it will be the entrant who has an advantage in conducting 
that test.3  
One of the main claims of Christensen (1997) is that disruptive innovation is often associated 
with replacing incumbent firm market leadership despite (initial) technical underperformance in the 
predominant performance dimension. However, an entrant strategy of initially competing followed by 
later cooperating would suggest that, in some cases of disruptive technology, incumbent market 
leadership might still be preserved. Bower and Christensen (1995), in discussing managing disruptive 
technological change, do consider an incumbent acquisition strategy (though not a technology in-
licensing one). While the authors acknowledge and give examples of how such acquisitions have helped 
preserve incumbent market leadership, they point to both the innovator’s possible reluctance in pursuing a 
cooperative strategy as well as the difficulty of successfully executing acquisitions as challenges of this 
strategy. The end result is the predominant conclusion in the existing literature that disruptive innovation 
overturns incumbent market leadership. We now explore how an innovator’s commercialization strategy 
of initial cooperation followed by later cooperation might temper this view. 
3 Data 
We test this hypothesis using a new, hand-collected dataset of the automatic speech recognition 
(ASR) industry from its inception in 1952 through the end of 2010. ASR technology converts spoken 
language into text by modeling the sound waves generated by the human vocal tract. It is a science-based 
industry whose technology was incubated for many years in corporate and university research labs before 
coming to market. The earliest recorded ASR research effort was in 1952, when scientists at AT&T Bell 
Laboratories built a machine that could recognize the digits zero through nine when spoken in isolation. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
3 It is precisely because the incumbent has an option to negotiate for an entrant switch to cooperative 
commercialization that the incumbent has an incentive for the entrant to bear those risks and carry out the initial 
market test. In the absence of that option, the potential for disruption may see incumbents acquiring technologies 
just to put them on the shelf. 
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Similar projects sprang up shortly thereafter at nearby RCA Laboratories and Lincoln Laboratories in the 
U.S., as well as internationally at London’s University College, Kyoto University, and NEC. The early 
1960s brought the entry of Texas Instruments and the founding of IBM’s T.J. Watson Research Center, 
which invested in ASR. The industry’s first company dedicated exclusively to ASR was Threshold 
Technology, spun out of RCA Labs. Since then, ASR has been used for myriad applications including 
radiology dictation, plush toys that respond to voice, remote access to personal computers, 411 directory 
assistance automation, personal telephone assistants, and podcast transcription.  
ASR is an attractive industry for this study for at least two reasons. First, it represents a 
commercialization environment where cooperating with incumbents does not strongly dominate 
competing in the product market or vice versa. Technology is strongly excludable, with ASR firms having 
filed more than 3,000 patents. While complementary assets are often needed to bring innovations to 
market, including custom application development, many ASR entrants integrated into those assets 
Qualcomm-style in order to compete in the product market. This stands in contrast to other industries, 
such as automotive or biotechnology, where complementary assets such as clinical trials are so expensive 
and difficult for a startup to undertake that new entrants can hardly hope to “go it alone” (Baum, 
Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). And there is little risk that the algorithms can be expropriated when 
included as part of an end-user product. 
Second, ASR is an industry where considerable uncertainty surrounds the value of new 
innovations. At first glance this might seem surprising, as the performance of an algorithm would seem to 
be verifiable. Indeed, many ASR companies have published performance claims for many years. As early 
as September 1981 Interstate Electronics Corporation claimed 85% accuracy for its speech recognition 
technology. One month later, Weitek claimed 90% accuracy and the month after that, IBM claimed 91% 
accuracy. By February of the following year, Votan claimed 99% accuracy, matched that summer by 
Interstate Electronics and soon after by Verbex, NEC America, Dragon Systems, Kurzweil, Integrated 
Wave, General Instrument, and others. Such claims made it difficult for potential licensees to discriminate 
among technology suppliers, as reflected by the National Bureau of Standards’ observation regarding “the 
present untenable situation of nearly all vendors claiming 99% accuracy” (Creitz, 1982). The National 
Research Council echoed these concerns, lamenting that “there are no established/uniform procedures for 
the design, comparison, and evaluation of speech recognition” (Creitz, 1984).  
Additionally, some ASR entrants employed disruptive technologies. Such innovations may not 
perform as well on traditional metrics and thus may be less attractive to potential cooperation partners 
who may regard their value as suspect. Three such innovations are listed below: 
1) Software-only. ASR involves intensive audio signal processing, so early systems generally 
required algorithms to run on specialized DSP chips or standalone processing units. For example, 
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Speech Systems Inc.’s 1988 MEDTRANS radiology dictation system tethered dedicated 
hardware to a Sun Microsystems workstation, which provided the user interface. While the move 
to software promised both cost reduction and convenience as dedicated hardware was eliminated, 
these came at the expense of performance tradeoffs in vocabulary size and accuracy. 
Consequently, many firms were reluctant to abandon hardware acceleration. 
2) Word-spotting. Speech recognizers generally operate by attempting to decode all words spoken 
by the user, as is necessary in a dictation program. For some applications, however, it is less 
important to understand everything the user said and more important to capture a few key 
commands. As an example, some automated telephone call routing systems are designed to pick 
out the words “operator” and “collect call” while ignoring whatever else the user happened to say. 
Word-spotting promised to be advantageous for a niche set of applications, but the so-called 
“garbage models” required to filter out unwanted speech could be unreliable. Moreover, only a 
small number of keywords could generally be handled by such systems.  
3) Grammar-free recognition. Historically, speech recognition systems were configured to 
recognize from a set of words or phrases called a “recognition grammar.” The internal phonetic 
lattices generated by a statistical “Hidden Markov Model” search are pruned by comparing them 
against the set of allowed word sequences within the grammar. In grammar-free recognition, the 
results are not strictly filtered by a set of allowable phrases; the user may, in a sense, “say 
anything.” Of course, the system may not recognize unusual or nonsensical utterances, but if the 
acoustic evidence is strong enough, it may override the prior word-sequence probabilities in the 
bigram/trigram models.  
In the analysis section, we present evidence suggesting that these technologies indeed were disruptive in 
that they underperformed existing technologies initially but gradually improved over time. 
The data for our study comprise nearly sixty years since the inception of the ASR industry. The 
original archives consist of approximately 15,000 pages of several monthly trade journals variously 
spanning the years 1981 through 2010, as well as a historical account of the industry from its inception in 
1952.4 While it is possible that some firms have been omitted from the newsletters or historical 
documents, even obscure companies were covered in detail. These trade journals offer the ability to 
characterize entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and choices “as it happened” from third-party accounts rather 
than relying on retrospective reconstruction of events. Moreover, they offer detail regarding the strategy 
formulation process that is unavailable from business registers or other traditional data sources. 
The first author, along with research assistants, read and coded the monthly trade journals by 
hand. We noted in each article the ASR firms mentioned and coded them as “active” in that month. A 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
4 Few firms were active in the 1970s and earlier, and results are robust to omitting pre-1981 data. 
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firm was counted as having entered the industry as of its first mention in the trade journals. A firm was 
coded as having left the industry when a trade journal article noted that it either ceased operations in the 
ASR industry or was acquired by another company. For firms that were never noted to have left the 
industry, we checked current corporate websites to ensure that they were still operating in the ASR 
industry as of December 2010. For the few that were not, we attempted to determine their date of exit 
from public sources; when such information was not otherwise available, we backdated their exit date to 
their final mention in the trade journals. Patterns of entry and exit are depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
3.1 Technology Commercialization Strategies (TCS) Variables 
Perhaps most unique to our study, we coded commercialization strategies undertaken by the firm. 
The adoption of a particular TCS was coded as having taken place the month it was reported in the trade 
journal. Firms that competed directly for end customers by offering products or services were classified as 
having adopted a “Compete” strategy. For example, Dragon Systems sold software enabling consumers to 
dictate onto their personal computers. Tellme Networks offered an advertising-supported 1-800 number 
for retrieving sports scores, stock quotes, etc. on its voice platform. Firms were categorized as adopting a 
Compete strategy if, using information from the trade journals, they sold end-user products, built custom 
solutions, or provided an advertising-supported service. By contrast, ASR firms that licensed technology 
or development tools were classified as having a “Cooperate” strategy. As examples, BBN licensed its 
ASR technology; VoiceObjects supplied toolkits that companies used to build end-user applications. If 
both compete and cooperate strategies were mentioned at entry, the firm was coded as having started with 
them simultaneously as a “mixed mode” (Teece, 1986). 
A shift of commercialization strategy from Compete to Cooperate or vice versa was coded as 
such only if an initial TCS was noted in the newsletters, followed by a subsequent mention of a different 
TCS. The variable switched TCS was set to 1 for a given firm-year observation if the firm had previously 
changed from its initial TCS, and 0 otherwise. Sub-categorizations of this variable were also noted for 
firms switching from Cooperate→Compete and vice versa. As an example of a switch from a Cooperate 
to a Compete strategy, Nuance Communications initially embarked on a cooperative commercialization 
strategy involving technology licensing and the sale of development toolkits. But a December 2002 trade 
journal article described Nuance’s switch to a competitive TCS: “Nuance has in the past emphasized sales 
through partners…contribut[ing] 82% of Q3 revenues. Nuance will develop and sell pre-packaged 
applications directly, and has formed an applications group to develop the applications. Nuance will sell 
directly to end-user customers” (Meisel 2002, emphasis ours).  
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As an example of switching from Compete→Cooperate, Vlingo Corporation began by integrating 
its speech recognition technology into a downloadable application for smartphones, only later entering 
into OEM licensing agreements with device manufacturers. Vlingo was among the early adopters of 
grammar-free speech recognition for cellular phones, which was a bold move that met with skepticism 
regarding its feasibility. Vlingo began demonstrating its grammar-free speech recognition for phones in 
early 2005, fully five years before the entrant Siri released its iPhone application. At the time, most ASR 
technologies for mobile phones were embedded into the handset, offering limited functionality such as 
dialing phone numbers by voice. Vlingo offered to dictate text messages and perform freeform internet 
searches, taking advantage of recently introduced, but not yet widely available 3G data networks. Michael 
Phillips, co-founder of Vlingo, recalled his firm’s reasons for adopting a dynamic commercialization 
strategy: “Having the consumer product greatly strengthened our ability to get the OEM deals – prove the 
technology works, and to be the safe choice for the OEMs because they know that consumers will like it. 
Even if you are losing money on the direct to consumer [product] that is OK because you will make it up 
on the OEM [licensing deals]. We cut back on the consumer effort – the pressure meant we needed to 
divert the resources.” (Phillips, 2013).  
In analyzing switches from one TCS to another, one must decide how to classify firms that started 
with a Compete strategy and then were acquired. The literature on commercialization strategy generally 
treats acquisitions as examples of a Cooperate strategy, as the firm ceases to compete against others either 
in the product or licensing market (e.g., Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). Moreover, the decision to align 
oneself through acquisition is an irreversible strategic decision. Accordingly, our default analysis treats 
companies that started with a Compete strategy and then were acquired (or adopted a licensing strategy) 
as having switched to a Cooperate strategy. We also provide robustness tests for our main findings by not 
considering acquisitions as instances of cooperation.  
In models where acquisitions are treated as cooperation, we count only “attractive” acquisitions, 
as opposed to the purchase of a company (or its assets) at a “fire sale” price resulting in little or no 
financial gain for shareholders. Following Arora and Nandkumar (2011), we classify an acquisition as 
attractive if it meets the following criteria. First, for venture capital-backed ventures, the acquisition price 
must exceed the invested capital. Second, for non-VC-backed ventures (or VC-backed ventures where the 
acquisition price was not available), either evidence from press releases and news stories that the founder 
or CEO of the focal firm joined the acquirer or an upward sales and/or headcount growth trend must exist. 
We implemented these criteria by retrieving acquisition values from SDC, Zephyr, and other public 
sources, by reviewing press materials associated with the acquisition and by assessing headcount and 
sales trends using data from Dun & Bradstreet (Walls, 2010). Using this method to determine whether 
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sales and headcount grew or shrank in the year prior to the acquisition, approximately one-quarter of 
acquisitions were classified as unattractive.  
3.2 Adopting Possibly-Disruptive Technologies Variable 
Our theory proposes initial competition followed by eventual cooperation as a means of 
mitigating uncertainty regarding the commercial value of a technology. As described above, we exploit 
firms’ adoption of potentially-disruptive ASR technologies as a measure of increased uncertainty 
regarding commercialization value. As described above, these are 1) software-only, 2) word-spotting, and 
3) grammar-free (introduced in 1990, 1992, and 2001 respectively). We flag a firm as a “pioneer” if it 
adopts any of these technologies within three years of its initial introduction into the market, (results are 
robust to a two- or four-year window). For example, Logica Cambridge (UK) introduced word-spotting in 
April 1992. Logica Cambridge and other firms adopting word-spotting by April 1995 are marked as 
having adopted this potentially-disruptive technology. We reason that such technologies, which typically 
deliver poorer performance along existing dimensions, will be perceived as having particularly uncertain 
commercialization value when they are first introduced.  
In firm-level analyses, we use a non-time-varying indicator of whether the firm ever adopted a 
potentially disruptive technology. Longitudinal analyses at the firm-month level instead use a time-
varying variable, set to 1 only in the year the firm adopted the potentially disruptive technology. Results 
also hold when coding the variable as 1 in the year of adoption and “decaying” thereafter by setting the 
value in subsequent years to 1/n where n is the number of years since adoption.  
3.3 Control Variables 
In addition to dates of operation, we collected data regarding organizational heritage as well as 
strategic choices. Organizational data included whether the company was a de alio or de novo entrant, and 
is motivated by the literature suggesting that organizational heritage implies different beginning 
knowledge, even if firms are founded at the same time (e.g., Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). For de novo 
startups, we recorded whether any of the founders had previously worked at another ASR firm (these 
firms are coded as spinoff firms, following the convention in the literature). For most firms, the trade 
journals contained information allowing us to code these organizational heritage variables; where such 
information was not available, we consulted public sources including company websites to determine the 
founders’ prior work experience. In a small number of cases where these sources proved uninformative, 
we contacted founders to ask whether they had had prior experience in the ASR industry. We were able to 
characterize the heritage of all but 35 de novo firms (results are similar whether we exclude these 
unclassifiable de novo firms, assume that they were spinoffs, or assume that they were not). We also 
noted whether the de novo companies were sponsored by their parent firms, either in part or as wholly-
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owned subsidiaries (classified as de alio). We also recorded funding, leadership transitions, and patents. 
Financing sources included venture capital (cross-checked with VentureXpert), government, banks, other 
firms, or the public markets (i.e., IPOs). To round out the organizational variables, CEO transitions were 
noted, and data on granted patents were merged based on application date. Performance variables are 
derived from Dun & Bradstreet, which were available only for U.S. firms after 1989. ASR firm names 
were matched manually for relevant establishments, with a success rate of 91.8%. D&B records annual 
sales as well as headcount, both of which we use in raw form.  
4 Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics and Trends 
A total of 651 ASR firms are observed in the trade journals. We exclude 55 publicly traded firms 
from our analysis, as these are less likely than private firms to be acquired. We also drop 17 (private) 
professional services firms that did not enter the industry with an innovation. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the remaining 579 ASR firms are in Table 1. Firm-level observations are in Panel A; 
Panel B contains firm-year observations. (Although the trade journals were issued monthly, we collapsed 
observations to the firm-year level for analysis; models using firm-month observations yield consistent 
results.) Dun & Bradstreet data is available for 379 of the 579 firms, reducing the number of observations 
in models utilizing D&B-based variables. Slightly more than half of ASR firms are de alio firms while 
one tenth are intra-industry spinoffs. Approximately one-sixth of firms have an ASR-related patent. One-
quarter of the firms raised venture capital. The CEO was replaced in 12% of firms. 
Table 1 about here 
Regarding technological commercialization strategies, 60% started by competing in the product 
market versus 38% starting with cooperation. (Two percent of firms were recorded as starting with a 
hybrid strategy of simultaneously cooperating and competing.) This relatively even split between the two 
types of commercialization strategy reinforces our claim that ASR firms are not subject to the sort of 
environmental pressures that strongly direct the choice of commercialization strategy as in other 
industries such as biotechnology.  
Twenty percent of firms either pioneered or were early adopters of one of the disruptive ASR 
technologies described above. The corresponding time-varying variable is nonzero for 3% of 
observations. We note that no ASR firm was an early adopter of more than one of these potentially 
disruptive technologies, which should not be surprising given that such innovations underperform on 
traditional metrics such as accuracy and vocabulary size. However, several firms eventually adopted 
multiple of these innovations. For example, Voice Control Systems was an early adopter of word-spotting 
but did not adopt a software-only approach until several years after its introduction.  
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4.2 Disruptive vs. Sustaining Technologies: Initial Tradeoffs and Eventual Trajectories 
Here we offer evidence that the technologies listed as potentially disruptive did in fact 
underperform initially but then improve over time using three approaches. First, we compare initial 
vocabulary sizes. Second, we follow financial performance over time. Third, we follow Dahlin and 
Behrens (2005) in examining patterns of backward-citation overlap.  
4.2.1 Initial Vocabulary Size 
As argued above, although recognition accuracy is a key performance measure, even as of the 
early days of the industry most ASR firms had begun to claim 99% accuracy, rendering this an 
uninformative measure. We instead explore another metric where there exists considerable heterogeneity 
across firms: vocabulary size. Vocabulary size refers to the number of words or phrases a particular ASR 
technology is capable of recognizing. For example, some early ASR technologies were designed to 
distinguish between the vocabulary set of “yes” and “no”—the vocabulary size is two. By contrast, a 
technology capable of recognizing U.S. city and state pairs (e.g., “Orlando, Florida”) would have a 
vocabulary size of tens of thousands. Although not every firm published claims regarding vocabulary-size 
metrics, we were able to locate vocabulary-size data at entry for 455 of the 579 firms (78.6%) in the trade 
journals. Considerable heterogeneity of vocabulary size exists, ranging from two words to well over a 
million. Mean vocabulary size for all firms, as coded from the trade journals, is 12,426 with a standard 
deviation of 26,288.  
Vocabulary sizes at entry are indeed smaller for firms adopting potentially-disruptive ASR 
technologies. Difference-of-means tests in Panel A of Table 2 show that firms adopting disruptive 
technologies have vocabulary sizes approximately half as large as firms that utilize only sustaining 
technologies. These differences are statistically significant whether examining all firms or winsorizing the 
top and bottom 1% (the latter carried over to our multivariate analysis). We consider additional covariates 
in Panel B of Table 2, again winsorizing although results do not depend on dropping any observations. 
Column 1 reconfirms the connection between disruption and lower vocabulary sizes as shown in Panel A, 
while Column 2 controls for various factors including year, organizational heritage, patenting, and 
venture capital. The magnitude of the negative correlation between disruption and vocabulary size 
strengthens both in economic and statistical significance when adding covariates. This correlation is also 
recovered in Column 3, which controls for sales, even though doing so reduces the analysis set to those 
firms for which we have Dun & Bradstreet data.  
Table 2 about here 
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4.2.2 Financial performance 
The initially identifiable characteristic of disruptive technologies is that they suffer along 
traditional performance characteristics, as illustrated with the lower vocabulary size of ASR systems 
incorporating word-spotting, software-only, or grammar-free technologies. At first, these tradeoffs make 
incumbents reluctant to develop internally or in-license disruptive technologies, as uncertainty surrounds 
their commercial value. What makes the technologies attractive licensing or acquisition candidates later is 
the threat they pose once uncertainty has been resolved and the value of disruptive technologies has been 
demonstrated in the marketplace. While we were able to retrieve vocabulary size at entry for nearly four 
out of five ASR firms at the time of entry, longitudinal vocabulary-size data was not reliably available for 
more than a handful of firms. As an alternative approach, we analyze the financial performance of 
disruptors versus firms that employed only sustaining technologies. 
Figure 2 plots these dynamics. The y-axis represents annual sales per employee, calculated from 
the Dun & Bradstreet data, and represents the closest possible calculation of organizational efficiency 
using these data. The x-axis is the number of years since entry. It is visible in Figure 2 that those using 
disruptive technologies start out with comparatively low sales per employee around the time of entry. 
Eventually, however, these firms become roughly as productive as those depending entirely on sustaining 
technologies, and eventually surpass them. Thus it appears that disruptive ASR technologies, though they 
initially trade off performance, indeed improve over time. 
Figure 2 about here 
4.2.3 Backward citation overlap 
As further evidence for our classification of disruptive technologies, we adopt the methodology of 
Dahlin and Behrens (2005).5 Using a measure of backward patent citation overlap, they hypothesize that 
radical innovations should have low backward citation overlap with concurrent or past patents in the same 
area (and so can be interpreted as an ex ante measure of radical innovation). For radical innovations that 
become successful and are thus adopted, similar to our definition of a disruptive technology, their citation 
overlap with future patents will be higher than for older or concurrent patents (an ex post measure). Their 
approach of measuring both ex-ante radicalness and ex-post adoption closely parallels the notion of a 
disruptive technology being shunned initially when it underperforms, but becoming more widely accepted 
over time as its performance improves. 
Applying their methodology to our context, we construct dyadic patent citation overlap scores for 
6013 patents in the ASR industry, with more than 36 million computations. We classify the patents for a 
given firm as disruptive according to whether we classified the firm as having adopted a disruptive 
technology by that calendar year. Dyadic patent overlap is calculated as the ratio of the number of patents 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
5 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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cited by both patents in the dyad divided by the number of patents cited by either of the two patents and is 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
Panel A of Table 3 performs the Dahlin/Behrens analysis using the above classification of 
disruptive ASR technologies. The first row of Panel A shows that disruptive ASR patents have 
significantly less citation overlap with other patents filed in the same calendar year than do non-disruptive 
patents, with means significantly different at the 5% level. The difference is even starker when comparing 
overlap with past patents in the second row of Panel A; again, patents we classify as disruptive 
technologies have much less citation overlap with past patents than do non-disruptive patents. Thus the 
Dahlin/Behrens ex-ante test for radicalness holds for our classification. 
The ex-post Dahlin/Behrens test of successful adoption holds for our classification as well. Note 
that this test does not specify that the backward citation overlap for future patents be higher for disruptive 
technologies—hence, no difference of means test is provided in the third row of Panel A. Rather, it 
specifies that the increase in citation overlap from past patents to future patents should be higher for 
disruptive technologies. The final row of Panel A does this, comparing the backward citation overlap 
rates of patents filed before the year of the focal patent versus those after the filing year. Patents classified 
as disruptive enjoy 65.6% growth in citation overlap with patents filed after the focal patent while for 
non-disruptive patents, as citation overlap shrinks by 10.5%.  
As a robustness check, we perform a placebo analysis using alternative formulations of disruptive 
technology in the ASR industry. In addition to software-only, word-spotting, and grammar-free 
recognition described above, our coding also identified several additional ASR technologies: adaptive 
recognition, where the system automatically adapts to the user over time; speaker-independent, where the 
system does not require manual training; continuous speech, where the speaker does not need to pause 
between words, and multi-lingual support. We created a disruptive “placebo” including all of these 
technologies, as well as various subsets of those technologies. Panel B of Table 3 then repeats the analysis 
of Panel A for our placebo definition of disruptive technologies. Indeed, we find that the placebo group 
fails both the ex-ante test for radicalness and the ex-post test for eventual successful adoption.  
 
4.3 Disruptive Technology Adoption and Commercialization Strategy 
Table 4 shows the distribution of technology commercialization strategies for firms adopting 
sustaining versus disruptive technologies. 461 ASR firms relied solely on sustaining technologies, while 
118 or approximately one-fifth of firms were early adopters of disruptive technologies. Two patterns are 
visible. First, early adopters of disruptive technologies are much less likely to cooperate with incumbents. 
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Only 21.2% of disruptors fixed on a Cooperate strategy (and never switched) compared to 36% of those 
relying on sustaining technologies, whereas the reverse pattern obtained for Compete strategies. As is 
visible in the rightmost column of Table 4, these differences are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  
Second, firms that adopt disruptive technologies are more likely to switch from a 
Compete→Cooperate TCS. 12.7% of disruptors undertake this dynamic commercialization strategy 
versus 7.8% of non-disruptors, differences again significant at the 5% level. Note that the percentage of 
firms adopting a Cooperate→Compete strategy is not meaningfully different between the two types of 
firms. 
Table 4 about here 
In Table 5, we revisit the analysis of Table 4 in a multivariate context using a multinomial logistic 
specification while still keeping the firm as the unit of analysis. The baseline outcome is adopting a 
(permanent) Cooperate commercialization strategy. Each model has multiple columns, each 
corresponding to another of the commercialization strategies. The coefficients in each column of a given 
model are associated with the selection of that column’s commercialization strategy relative to the 
baseline. For example, the first column in Model 1 examines the likelihood of adopting a (permanent) 
Compete commercialization strategy relative to the baseline of Cooperate. The positive and statistically-
significant coefficient on adopting a disruptive technology in the third column of Model 1 is consistent 
with Table 4’s indication that firms adopting disruptive technologies are more likely to adopt a 
Compete→Cooperate TCS.  
Model 2 of Table 5 refines the analysis by adding several firm-level covariates. Firms entering 
later are considerably more likely to adopt a (permanent) Compete strategy, as shown by the positive and 
significant coefficient on year of entry in the column for the Compete strategy. Intra-industry spinoffs are 
considerably more likely to shift TCS, whether from Cooperate→Compete or Compete→Cooperate. 
Changing from Cooperate→Compete is strongly associated with having replaced the CEO, while 
Compete→Cooperate switches are more common among VC-backed ventures.  
Net of these covariates, the association between a (permanent) Compete strategy and adopting 
disruptive technology in Model 2 is somewhat weaker, with statistical significance at the 10% level. 
However, the strategy of switching from Compete→Cooperate is still strongly associated with firms that 
adopted disruptive technologies. The odds ratio of temporarily integrating as compared to pursuing a 
permanent Cooperation strategy, are about two and a half times higher  (e0.7813=2.4) for firms adopting 
disruptive technologies. This result is robust in Model 3 to accounting for the firm’s maximum annual 
sales, which reduces the number of observations considerably but maintains the economic and statistical 
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significance of the coefficient on disruptive technology in the column for the Compete→Cooperate 
commercialization strategy. 
In Model 4, we replace our definition of disruptive technology adoption with the Dahlin and 
Behrens (2005) metric for the growth in citation overlap from past patents to future patents. Whereas the 
analysis of Table 3 compiled citation overlap generally and then compared firms that pioneered disruptive 
technologies (according to our definition) with those that did not, here we instead calculate these metrics 
on a firm-by-firm basis. For each patent at the firm, the citation overlap is calculated for every ASR 
patent filed after the focal patent and then for every patent filed before the focal patent. Next, the growth 
(or decrease) in citation overlap from past patents to future patents is calculated and then averaged for all 
of the firm’s patents. (Most ASR firms do not patent, so the number of observations is necessarily limited 
in this analysis.) The resulting continuous variable is logged for skew and substituted for the ever adopted 
disruptive technology dummy in Model 4. If the Dahlin/Behrens method of identifying disruptive 
technologies (i.e., those that were radical from the outset but became successful) holds, then firms with 
greater growth in citation overlap from past to future patents should be more likely to adopt a dynamic 
Cooperate→Compete commercialization strategy. This proves to be the case in Model 4, with a positive 
coefficient of comparable size to those in Models 1-3 and with statistical significance at the 5% level. 
(Note: because the measure in Model 4 is calculated at the firm level, we do not employ it in the 
longitudinal analysis below.) 
Table 5 about here 
In Table 6, we shift the unit of analysis to firm-year observations. Our explanatory variable of 
adopting disruptive technology is now set to 1 only in the year of adoption; similarly, other firm-level 
covariates from Panel A of Table 2 are replaced with time-varying variables from Panel B of Table 2. 
Given our longitudinal, right-censored data, we use a Cox hazard model where the failure event is defined 
as a firm changing its commercialization strategy. Switching can occur either from Compete→Cooperate 
or Cooperate→Compete, which we examine in separate sets of models. Models 1-3 of Table 6 examine 
the subset of firms that started with a Compete commercialization strategy, while Models 4-6 restrict 
analysis to firms that started with Cooperate. 
Given that the sample in Models 1-3 is firms starting with a Compete TCS, the dependent 
variable is therefore restricted to transitions from Compete→Cooperate. Model 1 shows a strong 
correlation between adopting disruptive technology and switching from Compete→Cooperate without 
introducing any control variables. Firms that started with a Compete commercialization strategy are about 
four times as likely (e1.38=3.97) to shift from Compete→Cooperate when they adopt a disruptive ASR 
technology. This result is also recovered when adding covariates in Model 2, which accounts for the 
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higher propensity of firms to switch from Compete→Cooperate when they are intra-industry spinoffs, 
once they have raised venture capital, or once the CEO has been replaced. Model 3 introduces controls for 
sales performance, which reduces the number of observations but strengthens the statistical significance 
of the result.  
In the remaining models of Table 6, we rule out the possibility that disruptive technology is not 
especially connected with switching from competition to cooperation but rather is associated with 
dynamic commercialization strategies in either direction. Models 4-6 analyze the subset of ASR firms that 
started with a Cooperate commercialization strategy, so the dependent variable is switching from 
Cooperate→Compete. Model 4 shows no connection between adopting disruptive technology and shifting 
from Cooperate→Compete. Adding control variables in Models 5 and 6 shows that transitioning from 
Cooperate→Compete does appear to be connected to patenting, replacing the CEO, and (depending on 
the specification) raising venture capital. No correlation with adopting disruptive technology is found, 
though. Thus we can conclude that firms adopting disruptive technologies are more likely to adopt a 
dynamic strategy of competing initially and cooperating later. 
Table 6 about here 
4.4 Robustness  
 In Table 7, we assess the robustness of the longitudinal analysis of Table 6. Model 1 repeats the 
analysis of model 3 of Table 6 in order to facilitate comparisons. Models 2-4 revisit the choice of a three-
year window following the initial introduction of a disruptive technology in order to identify early 
adopters of that disruptive technology. In Model 2, we identify as disruptors firms that adopted a 
disruptive technology within two years of its original introduction to the market. As expected, the 
coefficient on adopting disruptive technology is positive and statistically significant in Model 2 (firms 
starting with a Compete TCS) indicative that disruptors are more likely to switch from Compete to 
Cooperate. Likewise, in Model 3 we see that results are robust to identifying adopters of a disruptive 
technology within four years of its original introduction. An unreported five-year window works as well; 
however, restricting analysis only to the original pioneers of each of the three disruptive technologies 
does not yield reliable estimates because only three firms are labeled as disruptive. We moreover note that 
the firm-level analyses of technology commercialization strategy choice in Table 5, and the vocabulary-
size analysis of Table 2, are both robust to these alternate windows. 
Table 7 about here 
Model 4, instead of labeling only the firm-year disruption observation as 1 in the year of 
adoption, accounts for the possibility that it may take some time for a disruptive technology to prove its 
worth. In a sense, such technologies may be most disruptive when initially adopted and less so over time. 
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The disruptive-adoption variable is still set to 1 in the year of adoption; subsequent years are however set 
to 1/n where n is the number of years since adoption (e.g., in the third year after adopting the disruptive 
technology, this variable is set to 1/3). Magnitudes and statistical significance of the relevant coefficients 
in Model 4 resemble those of prior models. 
 Model 5 of Table 7 confirms that our results are not an artifact of acquisition patterns alone. We 
argued earlier for considering a firm that started with a Compete strategy but that then accepted an 
attractive acquisition offer as having switched to Cooperate, as acquisitions have often been treated as 
cooperative strategies in prior literature. Given that acquisitions might alternatively be seen as outcomes 
and sources of liquidity, in Model 5 we no longer consider entering into an acquisition as a move from 
Compete to Cooperate. Here, the switch to a cooperative commercialization strategy includes only those 
firms that begin to license out their technology while remaining an independent firm. If anything, the 
magnitude of the correlation between adopting disruptive technologies and switching from Compete to 
Cooperate is stronger in this model.  
4.5 Alternative explanations 
An alternative account of our results might suggest that the correlation between adopting a 
disruptive technology and switching from a Compete to Cooperate TCS might be explained simply by a 
process of learning and experimentation. This view is widely held by scholars who have suggested 
“technology entrepreneurs often ‘iterate’ towards a position which fits their overall environment” (Gans 
& Stern, 2003: 346). Multiple case studies (Murray and Tripsas 2004; Gavetti and Rivkin 2007) suggest 
that changing from one’s original strategy is not uncommon—in fact, Bhide (2000) finds that one-third of 
the Inc. 500 changed from their original strategy. If the results were explained by a process of trial and 
error, we might expect to see switching from Cooperate→Compete as well as Compete→Cooperate in the 
presence of a disruptive technology, but our results in Tables 5 and 6 are unidirectional only. This 
alternative mechanism would also predict that switching TCS is more likely when sales performance lags, 
as a leading reason for trial and error based pivoting would be dissatisfaction with status quo 
performance. Similarly, if the business environment has changed to make an initial TCS less compelling, 
this would likely be reflected in sales levels and/or sales growth. However, Table 6 shows that across 
specifications, neither annual sales nor past-year sales growth are strongly related to the likelihood of 
switching TCS (regardless of initial TCS). 
A second class of alternative explanation is that industry level evolution could explain the 
empirical patterns. This might stem from general or specific reasons. The general explanation is that for 
reasons including but not limited to management fads and fashions, a cooperate TCS became more 
popular over time (and so we would expect to see more strategy changes in the compete to cooperate 
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direction for reasons outside of our temporary competition rationale). This might seem particularly 
plausible given Fosfuri’s (2006) finding that licensing among large chemical companies is increasing in 
the number of technology suppliers—a number we might expect to grow as an industry expands. Data 
consistent with our theory that entrants facing commercialization uncertainty will initially forward-
integrate into the product market and only later switch to cooperating with incumbents might alternatively 
be explained by an industry-evolution process in which cooperation becomes the preferred TCS over 
time.  
If anything, however, the data indicate a trend away from, not toward, cooperation as a dominant 
TCS. Panel A of Figure 3 plots the density of ASR firms by entry mode, with overall ASR firm density 
for reference. While cooperation dominates early on, this trend reverses sharply by the mid-1990s. Panel 
B refines this view, restricting the graph only to new entrants (given the small number of entrants per 
year, observations are grouped into five-year intervals). As in the full density plot of Panel A, Panel B 
shows that a competitive TCS dominates later on among new entrants. It would therefore be difficult to 
conclude that switching commercialization strategies from Compete→Cooperate can be explained by an 
industry trend toward a cooperative TCS."
Figure 3 about here 
The more specific version of this alternative explanation is that technology licensing has become 
more popular over time. One possible explanation for this is that the number of potential licensees has 
expanded over time, but all of our models include a count of potential licensing partners (# firms 
w/compete TCS). However, as seen in Table 6 this variable has no bearing on the hazard of switching 
TCS. A second shift in the market for licensing took place following the demise of a large and notable 
ASR firm, Lernout and Hauspie (L&H). This event might have induced a strategy shift in the remainder 
of the industry from a Compete to Cooperate TCS for reasons unrelated to disruptive technology but 
rather to fill the resulting technology licensing void. The Belgian company was in the late 1990s the 
largest firm in the industry. It had a cooperative TCS, licensing its algorithms widely. L&H reported 
revenue growth massive enough to prompt inquiry, though the firm’s financials were not transparent since 
it was not subject to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure. This changed in 2000 
when L&H acquired Dictaphone, a U.S.-based company that represented a large percentage of L&H’s 
revenue and which triggered SEC disclosure requirements. Investigators noted, among other irregularities, 
that sales in Korea and Singapore had skyrocketed from less than $300,000 to $143.2 million during 
1999, mainly to 30 companies (several of which shared the same address). Wall Street Journal reporter 
Jesse Eisinger found that several of those companies claimed never to have done business with L&H. 
L&H CEO Gastion Bastiens stepped down shortly after the article was published, and the SEC launched 
an audit. Following the audit, L&H restated earnings since 1998 and the founders stepped down as co-
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chairmen. Trading of its stock was suspended, as by November 2000 the company filed for bankruptcy 
amid what Forbes called an “exodus of talent” (Einstein, 2000).  
The sudden demise of Lernout & Hauspie left a vacuum that in theory made the cooperative TCS 
more attractive due to diminished competition. As such, firms with a compete TCS might have been 
motivated following the bankruptcy to switch to a cooperate TCS in order to take advantage of L&H’s 
absence, and it is possible that the positive impact of pivoting from compete to cooperate is due in (great) 
part to the demise of L&H. Accordingly, in Model 6 of Table 7 we exclude all observations after 2000. If 
it were the case that our prior findings were due in large part to L&H, then it should be difficult to find a 
positive and significant coefficient on adopted disruptive technology. This is not the case; the variable’s 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and if anything is larger in magnitude in prior 
analyses. We conclude that if the adoption of disruptive technology is connected with switching from a 
Compete to a Cooperate TCS, it is not due to an exogenous event such as the collapse of Lernout & 
Hauspie. 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Using a dataset of the population of entrants into the worldwide speech recognition industry from 
1952 through 2010, we find evidence consistent with a theory of entrepreneurial strategy in which 
commercializing disruptive technologies starts by competing with incumbents followed by a switch to 
cooperating with them.  Note that our results are not necessarily causal, as commercialization strategy is 
an endogenous decision. Our goal has been to show the association between disruptive innovation and 
entrepreneurial use of a dynamic commercialization strategy where the disruptor competes initially and 
later cooperates. The industry context we examine is advantageous not only because we are able to 
observe objective third party characterizations of technology commercialization strategy over time, but 
also because the speech recognition industry operates in a business environment in which no particular 
commercialization strategy is dominant and where there is within-industry variation in the introduction of 
disruptive innovations. 
From that standpoint, the leading case example of disruptive innovations in the hard disk drive 
industry overturning incumbent firm market leadership (Christensen, 1997) may reflect two distinct 
forces.6 First, industry incumbents may be reluctant to develop and/or acquire the potentially disruptive 
technology, as the Christensen line of research has emphasized. A second force, however, emerges from 
the business environment within which hard disk drive innovators operate (Gans and Stern, 2003): an 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
6 Christensen (1997) also finds the same effect of disruptions in the mechanical excavator and steel mini-mill cases 
as he finds in hard disk drives. We believe these other industry settings also exhibit similar commercialization 
environment characteristics as what we discuss in this paragraph for disk drives. 
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environment in which appropriability conditions are relatively weak (mechanical innovations are 
notoriously susceptible to backward engineering, for example) at the same time that the relative costs of 
assembling the requisite organizational complementary assets to enter the product market are low (the 
competitive supply of contract manufacturers may be available to hard disk drive innovators, so vertical 
integration may not even be necessary). The combination of these business environment forces, both of 
which favor a compete strategy, may conflate the “attacker’s advantage” nature of disruptive technologies 
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995).  
At the other end of the spectrum, in industries such as drug development, there is rarely 
replacement of incumbent firm market leadership despite waves of radical innovation in techniques of 
drug discovery over the past 40 years by biotechnology firms. The business environment explanation for 
this pattern would be that the appropriability regime for biochemical innovations is well-known to be 
strong (so innovators have some protection against expropriation threats when negotiating deal terms with 
industry incumbents) at the same time that the cost of acquiring the specialized downstream 
complementary assets is very high (in domains such as navigating the regulatory environment, sales 
channels, and even manufacturing). Certainly we cannot claim in a single-industry study to have mapped 
the full set of commercialization-environment contingencies; rather, we see this study serving as a 
counterexample to the generally-accepted notion that incumbents generally succumb in the face of 
disruptive technologies. One critical implication of our study for practitioners is that in certain 
commercialization environments, an incumbent facing disruption may in fact pursue a wait-and-see 
strategy (eventually cooperating with the disruptor). An important next step would be to examine the 
market leadership consequences of disruptive innovations in other business environments, including those 
where cooperative commercialization is strongly favored. 
In mixed business environments as in speech recognition, in which the appropriability regime is 
strong (favoring a cooperative strategy) at the same time that the relative cost of complementary asset 
acquisition is modest (favoring a competitive strategy), the innovator’s preferred commercialization 
strategy may not be as straightforward (Gans and Stern, 2003). Therefore, having studied the technology 
commercialization strategies of disruptive innovators in such settings may allow us to minimize the role 
of the business environment in independently shaping commercialization strategies. This discussion also 
allows us to speculate about the generalizability of this strategy, which may be most important in mixed 
commercialization environments in which the entrant with a potentially-disruptive innovation is torn 
between a cooperative and competitive strategy.  
Our work also makes two contributions beyond disruptive technologies. First, it may be that non-
disruptors who wish to cooperate with incumbents will find it advantageous to engage in an initial period 
of competition when it is difficult to establish the value of their technology or when they lack reputation 
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or other status markers, which can help to attract the attention of desirable commercialization partners. 
Second, while the extant literature on technology commercialization takes a static, one-time view of the 
strategic choice (Gans and Stern, 2003), we believe this to be the first paper to empirically show 
conditions under which a dynamic commercialization strategy can be efficient.    
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Table 3: Backward-citation overlap of patents 
Panel A: Disruptive technologies vs. non-disruptive technologies 
  
Panel B: Placebo test for non-disruptive technologies 
 
Note: Overlap calculations based on pairwise comparisons of 6013 ASR patents. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of commercialization strategies, by firm-level adoption of disruptive technology 
 
Note: The sample is limited to 579 non-public, non-consulting firms. The first two classifications indicate that the firm adopted a 
Cooperate or Compete strategy initially and never switched. The third classification indicates that the firm adopted both a Cooperate 
disruptive non-disruptive difference of means
overlap w/concurrent patents 0.0007479 0.0018466 0.0238
overlap w/past patents 0.0003261 0.0006791 0.0001
overlap w/future patents 0.0005401 0.0006079
overlap shift, future vs. past 65.6% -10.5%
disruptive placebo non-placebo difference of means
overlap w/concurrent patents 0.0022095 0.0016986 0.0279
overlap w/past patents 0.0008599 0.0006149 0.0001
overlap w/future patents 0.0005281 0.0006253
overlap shift, future vs. past -38.6% 1.7%
difference of means
Cooperate 166 36.0% 25 21.2% 0.002
Compete 227 49.2% 69 58.5% 0.038
both at first 8 1.7% 4 3.4% 0.261
Cooperate->Compete 24 5.2% 5 4.2% 0.668
Compete->Cooperate 36 7.8% 15 12.7% 0.048
461 100.0% 118 100.0%
Firms adopting only sustaining technologies Firms adopting disruptive technologies
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and Compete strategy initially. The last two classifications indicate that the firm adopted either a Cooperate or Compete strategy and 
then at some point switched to the other strategy. The final column reports p-values of a t test of different means. 
 
Table 5: Multinomial logistic regressions of technology commercialization strategy 
 
 
Note: The sample is limited to 579 non-public, non-consulting firms. Coefficients for the “both at first” outcome from Table 3 are not 
shown in order to conserve space. Given that only 2% of firms adopted such a strategy, most coefficients for the “both at first” 
outcome are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Results are little changed in an unreported model that omits the “both 
at first” outcome. Disruptive technology is defined in Models 1-3 as the firm ever having pioneered one of the following three ASR 
technologies: software-only, grammar-free, or word-spotting. In Model 4, this dummy is replaced by a continuous measure 
representing the growth in overlapping backward citations for the patents of a given firm, from patents filed prior to the year of the 
focal firm vs. the following year. 
outcomes Compete
Cooperate-> 
Compete
Compete-> 
Cooperate Compete
Cooperate-> 
Compete
Compete-> 
Cooperate Compete
Cooperate-> 
Compete
Compete-> 
Cooperate Compete
Cooperate-> 
Compete
Compete-> 
Cooperate
ever adopted disruptive technology 0.6962** 0.2776 1.0116** 0.4626+ 0.1666 0.7813* 0.0700 0.3468 0.8682* 0.4846 0.3579 1.1243*
(0.255) (0.535) (0.375) (0.267) (0.608) (0.395) (0.324) (0.654) (0.430) (0.337) (0.460) (0.530)
year of entry 0.1135*** 0.0206 0.0404+ 0.1469*** 0.0016 0.0255 0.1125* -0.0306 -0.0216
(0.016) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) (0.031) (0.048) (0.054) (0.064)
de alio entrant 0.4250+ 0.8015 -0.4666 0.5870+ 0.4841 -0.8280+ 1.0646 1.2041 -0.8985
(0.226) (0.558) (0.394) (0.315) (0.723) (0.490) (0.708) (0.997) (1.324)
spinoff 0.0874 1.7685** 1.0176* 0.0634 1.4336+ 0.8508 -0.4757 0.9400 1.1120
(0.379) (0.644) (0.466) (0.479) (0.799) (0.561) (0.865) (0.997) (0.875)
total # patents (L) -0.1532 0.5110* 0.1903 -0.2421 0.5815* 0.0174 -0.3013 0.4572 0.1381
(0.184) (0.203) (0.220) (0.239) (0.276) (0.271) (0.336) (0.349) (0.376)
ever raised VC 0.3425 0.2657 1.0019** 0.2545 0.1745 0.5616 -0.0504 -0.8306 -0.7870
(0.243) (0.482) (0.354) (0.299) (0.558) (0.410) (0.584) (0.798) (0.786)
ever replaced CEO -0.4213 2.2963*** 0.3797 -0.4006 1.7417** 0.2527 -0.0562 2.1972* 1.7421*
(0.398) (0.544) (0.488) (0.478) (0.647) (0.553) (0.715) (0.874) (0.865)
maximum annual sales (L) 0.0649 0.1059 0.1708 0.1989 0.0199 0.0009
(0.070) (0.157) (0.115) (0.179) (0.228) (0.225)
Constant 0.3190** -1.8871*** -1.5224*** -226.6185*** -44.8572 -82.5994+ -294.0497*** -8.0586 -54.6555 -227.4137* 58.6123 41.8035
(0.102) (0.215) (0.184) (31.274) (54.500) (47.422) (47.849) (72.073) (61.213) (96.534) (108.551) (128.475)
disruptive = citation overlap growth
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
(4)
101
(3)(1) (2)
579 579 379
no no no yes
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Table 6: Cox event-history models for correlates of changing commercialization strategies  
  
Note: The sample is limited to 579 non-public, non-consulting firms. Models 1 through 3 are limited to firms starting with a Compete 
strategy, so failure reflects switching from a Compete strategy to Cooperate, where Cooperate includes entering into an acquisition. 
Models 4 through 6 instead examine firms that started with a Cooperate strategy, so failure reflects switching to a Compete strategy. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
adopted disruptive technology 1.3807* 1.3712* 1.8623** 0.5502 0.5000 0.4648
(0.586) (0.568) (0.660) (0.977) (0.965) (1.030)
year of entry 0.0021 -0.1883 0.1687* -0.0064
(0.083) (0.168) (0.081) (0.134)
de alio entrant -0.3990 -0.6849 0.3119 0.1574
(0.380) (0.453) (0.335) (0.437)
spinoff 0.8712* 0.5348 0.6818+ 0.5373
(0.426) (0.478) (0.358) (0.444)
patents to date (L) 0.1136 0.1260 0.3562** 0.4297**
(0.186) (0.223) (0.137) (0.157)
already raised VC 0.6995* 0.4557 0.9859** 0.6013+
(0.337) (0.364) (0.313) (0.308)
CEO previously replaced 1.3000** 1.1095* 1.0467** 1.0169**
(0.420) (0.452) (0.342) (0.350)
# firms w/compete TCS -0.0038 0.0108 -0.0133 0.0052
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013)
annual sales (L) -0.1082 0.2032+
(0.140) (0.120)
Observations 1,717 1,717 1,221 1,340 1,340 760
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
initial TCS = Compete initial TCS = Cooperate
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Table 7: Robustness tests and alternative explanations 
 
Note: The sample is limited to 223 non-public, non-consulting firms that started with a Compete TCS. Column 1 repeats the analysis 
of Column 3 of Table 6. Dependent variable is the hazard of switching from a Compete TCS to a Cooperate TCS. In Column 5, 
acquisitions are not considered Cooperate strategies. Column 6 restricts analysis to the year 2000 and earlier.   
Cooperating TCS includes acquistitions yes yes yes yes no yes
Includes post-2000 data yes yes yes yes yes no
Disruption window (following adoption) 3 years 2 years 4 years 1/n decay 3 years 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
adopted disruptive technology 1.8623** 1.4058* 1.7218** 1.6906* 2.6952** 4.0287**
(0.660) (0.714) (0.652) (0.700) (0.942) (1.484)
year of entry -0.1883 -0.1836 -0.1864 -0.1933 -0.3121 0.2380
(0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.173) (0.298) (0.317)
de alio entrant -0.6849 -0.6695 -0.6996 -0.6764 -0.8382 -1.3227*
(0.453) (0.448) (0.458) (0.442) (0.829) (0.663)
spinoff 0.5348 0.5214 0.5344 0.5623 0.5447 0.1236
(0.478) (0.478) (0.476) (0.484) (0.827) (0.765)
patents to date (L) 0.1260 0.1416 0.1189 0.1421 0.4971 -0.0579
(0.223) (0.220) (0.228) (0.221) (0.419) (0.355)
already raised VC 0.4557 0.4473 0.4412 0.4810 0.1682 0.6960
(0.364) (0.361) (0.364) (0.366) (0.708) (0.592)
CEO previously replaced 1.1095* 1.0952* 1.1051* 1.1675* 1.1908 -0.0395
(0.452) (0.448) (0.452) (0.453) (0.971) (0.660)
# firms w/compete TCS 0.0108 0.0102 0.0108 0.0111 0.0181 -0.0031
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019)
annual sales (L) -0.1082 -0.1010 -0.1071 -0.1106 -0.4250* -0.0350
(0.140) (0.139) (0.140) (0.141) (0.199) (0.156)
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,274 337
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 2: Comparison of vocabulary size for firms adopting sustaining vs. disruptive technologies 
 
Panel A: Difference-of-means tests 
  
Note: the winsorized test drops observations above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile. 
 
Panel B: Negative binomial regressions of vocabulary size at entry, one observation per firm 
! !!
Note: The sample is limited to 455 firms (of the 579 non-public, non-consulting firms) for which 
vocabulary-size data could be found in the ASR trade journals. All columns drop observations 
above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile, resulting in 433 firms. Results are robust to 
not winsorizing. The number of observations is further reduced when controlling for maximum 
annual sales, available only for U.S.-based firms.!
!
obs. yes no p<
all firms 455 6761.2 15673.1 0.003
winsorized 433 7462.6 12897.5 0.048
ever adopted disruptive technology
(1) (2) (3)
ever adopted disruptive technology -0.5471** -0.6858*** -0.7084***
(0.177) (0.164) (0.211)
year of entry 0.0925*** 0.0752*
(0.025) (0.030)
de alio entrant -0.0384 -0.2064
(0.190) (0.242)
spinoff 0.2560 0.5218+
(0.248) (0.316)
total # patents (L) 0.6983*** 0.5537**
(0.150) (0.181)
ever raised VC 0.3296 0.3070
(0.253) (0.255)
ever replaced CEO -0.6004* -0.6489*
(0.271) (0.307)
maximum annual sales (L) 0.1480*
(0.059)
Constant 9.4648*** -175.7335*** -143.3958*
(0.118) (50.862) (60.641)
Observations 433 433 287
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Figure 1: ASR firm entry and exit since the inception of the industry in 1952. The connected blue 
line is the overall industry density (i.e. number of active firms).  
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Figure 2: Sales per employee since entry for firms adopting sustaining vs. disruptive technologies 
 
Note: Sample is limited to non-public, non-consulting firms that spent more than two years in the industry 
(n=291). Short-lived firms are omitted to avoid overreliance on sample attrition. Each data point is the 
three-year rolling average of sales per employee for that group of ASR firms; non-rolling-average plots 
look similar but have more year-to-year fluctuations.  
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Figure 3: Commercialization strategy density 
Panel A: All active ASR firms, by year 
! ! 
 
Panel B: New ASR entrants, by five-year intervals 
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Appendix A: Formal Model of Dynamic Commercialization Strategy 
Here, we provide a formal model of disruptive technologies and commercialization strategy 
choice. While formal models of disruptive technologies have been provided in the literature (e.g., Adner, 
2002; Adner and Zemsky, 2005; Chen and Turut, 2013), these models have focused on the structure of 
consumer demand that may give rise to entrant advantages. Those models have not considered the key 
choice between cooperative and competitive commercialization that is the focus of our study here. 
Model Set-Up 
There are two periods, 1 and 2, where an entrant with a new technology can choose to 
commercialize by either competing with an incumbent or cooperating (via licensing or acquisition) with 
that incumbent. Significantly, the entrant can exercise this choice in each period and thus, may compete 
or cooperate in both periods or choose one path and switch to another. In period 2, uncertainty regarding 
the value of the new technology is resolved and with it the trajectory of costs associated with the 
incumbent choosing to integrate the technology. There is a common discount factor of δ between the two 
periods. In notation, suppose that an incumbent earns profits V(i) where i = 0 (with the status quo product) 
and i = 1 (with a product that incorporates a new technology). There is uncertainty over the value of V(1). 
With probability p, V(1) is v + V(0) and with probability 1-p, V(1) = V(0). 
 
It is assumed that, to integrate the new technology prior to the resolution of uncertainty, the 
incumbent must sink costs, CI. Having sunk such costs, the uncertainty of V(1) is resolved. Thus, if the 
incumbent sinks integration costs, its expected profit is pv – CI + V(0) while if it does not, its expected 
profit is V(0). In this model, CI is a measure of the difficulty an incumbent would have integrating a new 
technology. As noted earlier, disruptive technologies are defined by worse performance on the 
dimensions valued by mainstream customers even if they both perform better for niche consumers and 
have a strong trajectory of improvement compared to existing technologies. Such technologies are 
naturally harder for incumbents, with an existing set of customers, to integrate into their products. This is 
also related to the limited capacity of innovations a single firm can likely commercialize at once 
(Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). For example, the technical characteristics of existing products may make 
integrating the new technology by picking the best of both worlds impossible. Thus, CI would represent 
the degradation in product performance for existing consumers caused by integration. Even if the new 
technology can be employed by the incumbent in a new product, CI may be high because launching new 
products may lead to a loss in corporate focus and brand confusion. Thus, CI is a parameter that varies 
and is related to the disruptiveness of the new technology. However, we assume that as more is learned 
about the new technology, the costs of incumbent integration fall. Thus, in period 2, those costs can fall to 
sCI (s < 1). This captures the notion that disruptive technologies can improve in their appeal to more 
consumers over time. 
 
New technologies are assumed to come from entrants. An entrant with a new technology can earn 
revenue v (with certainty) and a share, a (< 1), of V(1)-V(0) if they independently enter the market and the 
technology is not integrated with the incumbent. The entry costs the entrant, CE (assumed to be less than v 
+ av but greater than v).7 Such entry, if it is sustained, leads to the incumbent’s status quo profit, V(0), 
being reduced to bV(0) where b < 1. This only occurs if V(1) > V(0), otherwise, the entrant can earn at 
most v. Thus, competitive entry involves two impacts on the industry. First, the entrant must sink entry 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Thus, entry can be justified if the incumbent does not integrate the new technology and not otherwise. This 
assumption simplifies the cases examined in what follows and relaxing it would not appreciably change the results 
below. Importantly, if entry costs are sunk, the entrant will continue in the industry and earn v. Note that, unlike CI, 
CE does not fall as more about the technology is learned. This assumption seems conservative as there are reasons to 
suppose that for new entrants, entry can grow more difficult over time as uncertainty is resolved (see Foster, 1986). 
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costs to build duplicative product market assets of the kind emphasized by Teece (1986). Second, entry 
potentially results in a competitive effect and dissipates incumbent market power rents (Gans and Stern, 
2000). By contrast, if an entrant engages in cooperative commercialization with an incumbent, the 
incumbent can maintain its profits but still must sink costs, CI, in integration. This is a novel assumption 
for the model presented here, and distinguishes our contribution from the past literature on 
commercialization choices (Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2013). 
 
This can be most clearly seen if we consider commercialization choice as a one-time decision that 
is taken initially prior to uncertainty being resolved. Under cooperative commercialization, the entrant 
licenses the technology to the incumbent. As the incumbent integrates the technology, the entrant can earn 
at most v by entering and so does not do so. Thus, the total surplus accruing to the incumbent and entrant 
is: 
 
 
(1+δ )( pv +V (0)− t)−CI
Incumbent's profit under Coop
! "#### $####
+ (1+δ )t   
where t is the license fee paid by the incumbent to the entrant. By contrast, the entrant engages in 
competition, total surplus becomes: 
 
 
(1+δ )(v + pav)−CE
Start-up Profit under Comp! "### $###
+ (1+δ )( pbV (0)+ (1− p)V (0))
Incumbent Profit under Comp! "##### $#####
(1+δ )V (0)
 if 
(1+δ )(v + pav) ≥ CE
(1+δ )(v + pav) < CE
  
Thus, the total gains from cooperation relative to competition are 
 (1+δ ) p(1− a)v + p(1− b)V (0)− v( )−CI +CE  (if entry is credible) and  (1+δ ) pv −CI  (otherwise). Thus, 
a higher CI reduces the probability that cooperative commercialization occurs (Gans and Stern, 2003).8 
This yields the following empirical implication: entrants will initially choose competitive 
commercialization if the incumbent’s cost of integration is initially high.9  
Multiple Commercialization Choice Rounds 
Here we want to model a situation where the initial commercialization choice might be re-
evaluated and reversed following the resolution of uncertainty. Thus, we assume there are two periods. In 
period 1, the start-up chooses whether to compete or cooperate with the incumbent. At the end of that 
period, uncertainty concerning V(1) is resolved. In period 2, the start-up, regardless of whether it chose to 
license or not in period 1, chooses again whether to cooperate or compete from that point on. 
 
Working backwards, consider the entrant’s decision in period 2. First, if there has been 
competition in period 1 and the new technology is valuable, the total surplus from cooperation in period 2 
is  v + v +V (0)− sCI  while the total surplus from competition is  v + av + bV (0)  (as entry costs have 
already been incurred). Thus, cooperation will be chosen if  (1− a)v + (1− b)V (0) > sCI  (that is, if 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Throughout this model we focus on total surplus and how commercialization choice impacts that. As Gans and 
Stern (2000) and Gans (2012) demonstrate, this is what determines whether cooperative commercialization takes 
place. We could have used the Nash bargaining solution at each point commercialization strategy is chosen, but have 
chosen not to in order to economize on notation. 
9 We do not highlight this empirical implication in the main text to keep the focus on our main hypothesis, the 
relationship between a temporary competition strategy and commercializing a potentially disruptive technology. 
However, we have conducted empirical tests of this ancillary empirical prediction from the model. We find support 
for it in both a univariate and a multivariate regression framework, which are available on request. 
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preservation of monopoly rents exceeds the costs of integrating the technology). Note that, if the new 
technology is not valuable, the gains from licensing in period 2 are  (1− b)V (0)− sCI .  
 
Second, if there has been cooperation in period 1 and the new technology is valuable, the total 
surplus from cooperation in period 2 is  v +V (0)  (as integration costs have already been sunk) while the 
total surplus from competition is  v + av + bV (0)−CE . Thus, cooperation will be chosen if 
 (1− a)v + (1− b)V (0)+CE ≥ v . However, as  v < CE  this implies that cooperation, if chosen initially, will 
continue if the technology is valuable. If the new technology is not valuable, there are no further gains to 
entry and hence, the entrant effectively exits at this point.10 
 
Given this, we can now consider the period 1 commercialization choice. The total expected 
surplus from cooperation initially is: 
  (1+δ )V (0)+ (1+δ ) pv −CI  (1) 
and the total expected surplus from initial competition is: 
 
 
(1+δ )v + p(av + bV (0))+ pδ (v +V (0)− sCI )+ (1− p)δV (0)−CE
(1+δ )v + p(av + bV (0))+ pδ (v +V (0)− sCI )+ (1− p)δbV (0)−CE
(1+δ )v + p(1+δ )(av + bV (0))+ (1− p)δbV (0)−CE
 if 
(1− b)V (0) > sCI
(1− a)v + (1− b)V (0) > sCI ≥ (1− b)V (0)
(1− a)v + (1− b)V (0) ≤ sCI
 (2) 
Given this, Figure A1 depicts the equilibrium outcomes in (CE, CI) space. Note that, if CE is high relative 
to CI, then cooperation is chosen initially. In this model, that also implies that cooperation continues 
following the resolution of uncertainty. By contrast, if CI is high relative to CE, then competition is chosen 
initially. Here, however, two factors may cause a change in commercialization strategy. First, if 
uncertainty is resolved in favor of a valuable technology, the gains from trade to cooperation rise and so a 
switch to cooperation could occur. Second, even in the absence of a favorable state on technology value, a 
switch could arise as the use of the technology in competition may improve the trajectory of performance 
for the new technology and reduce the integration costs (i.e., s could be low). In this case, a switch occurs 
because integration costs following competition are lower.  
 
As noted earlier, disruptive technologies are characterized by (a) high costs of integration with 
the incumbent’s technology initially and (b) a trajectory of rapid performance improvement on traditional 
performance metrics. The former characteristic was captured by CI and the second was captured in our 
model by s. The model demonstrates that as CI gets higher and s gets lower (consistent with a technology 
being more disruptive), the set of parameters that supports an equilibrium commercialization strategy 
involving competing initially and then switching to cooperation becomes larger. This yields the main 
prediction we empirically investigate. 
! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Conceptually, the model thus far considers licensing as the mode of cooperative commercialization. The 
assumption here was that the incumbent would not be able to license a technology and then not use it. That it may 
not want to use it would be driven by the existence of CI but for the entrant, this would mean that licensing would 
not reveal the technology’s value and hence, would potentially harm future returns. If an incumbent were to acquire 
the entrant, then it would be a more plausible outcome that the technology might be shelved. However, from the 
entrant’s perspective, it is reasonable to suppose that acquisition, should it occur, would not be reversible and would 
be observationally an exit in the empirical analysis. Here, because cooperation persists when chosen, the model’s 
conclusions apply equally to acquisitions and licenses as modes of cooperative commercialization and are treated as 
such in the empirics. For an analysis on where licensing and acquisition may differ in observational outcomes, see 
Gans (2012). 
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Figure A1: Equilibrium Commercialization Strategies 
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Appendix B: Dataset Construction 
In chronicling the history of speech recognition and its commercialization it was not possible to rely 
purely on public sources such as SEC filings. Instead, we turned to a series of trade journals covering the 
industry from early commercialization attempts. As these publications were sent only to subscribers, we 
are deeply indebted to two individuals for making their archives available. William Meisel, president of 
TMAA Associates and publisher of Speech Recognition Update, Telephone Strategy Update, and Speech 
Strategy News, graciously made the complete set of his electronic archives available for all three 
newsletters. Walt Tetschner, publisher of ASRNews, likewise made his electronic archives available and 
also allowed us to borrow his personal, non-electronic archives of VoiceNews (William Creitz, editor), 
Voice Processing Newsletter (ed. Karl Kozarsky), and Voice Technology News (ed. Mark Mikolas).  
Meisel’s newsletters, along with ASRNews, focused specifically on ASR whereas the other newsletters 
reported on the voice industry more generally. Related voice technologies include text-to-speech 
generation (TTS), speaker verification (SV), and the digital recording and encoding technologies common 
to all of these. As such, these trade journals chronicle the development of several industries including 
interactive voice response systems (IVR, e.g. “for banking, press one…”), learning aids such as Speak ‘n 
Spell, and even voice mail. Given the core speech-coding technology shared between all of these, several 
firms participated in two or more areas. For example, InterVoice began by building IVR systems and later 
added speech recognition. By contrast, Centigram started out in 1977 developing both TTS and ASR 
algorithms but abandoned the latter in 1982, citing “poor market conditions.” Several ASR companies 
added SV to their offerings. While an examination of several voice technologies could be enabled by 
these archival sources, we have focused more narrowly on ASR alone. 
We started with VoiceNews since it was the only trade journal that reached back to the beginning of the 
1980s. Although VoiceNews was published through the late 1990s, it did not focus exclusively on ASR 
and, more detrimentally, was unavailable to us in 1986 and 1990, with only partial availability from 1987 
through 1989. We thus folded in Voice Processing Newsletter as it became available in 1984, though it 
was not available in 1988 and 1992. As it was a fairly brief newsletter, we also summarized Voice 
Technology News in 1989 and 1990 in order to provide more detail until we could switch to the more 
specialized ASRNews in the summer of 1990 (Voice Technology News was summarized through the end 
of 1990 to provide some overlap).  In 1993, Speech Recognition Update commenced publication. This as 
well as ASRNews continue through today and provide a nicely matched set as the editor of SRU is a 
former ASR company founder and perhaps a bit of a “cheerleader” for the industry whereas the editor of 
ASRNews is rather critical of the industry and leads off each issue with a column titled “The Emperor is 
Naked!”. The two combined provide a balanced view of events within the industry.  
Trade journal availability for each year is summarized in Figure B1. Coverage is present for every year 
since 1981, and since 1984 multiple journals cover each year except for 1986 and 1992. In addition to the 
trade journals described above, information on the history of ASR technology development—as opposed 
to commercialization—is borrowed from “Automatic Speech Recognition – A Brief History of the 
Technology Development” by B. H. Jung of the Georgia Institute of Technology and Lawrence R. 
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Rabiner of Rutgers University and the University of California at Santa Barbara (Juang and Rabiner, 
2004). 
The trade journals were coded as follows. For each (monthly) issue of each trade journal, key details from 
each story were summarized, including information beyond what is used in the analyses in the present 
paper. The data coded included the following fields: 
• Name of firm 
• Firm founder(s) and previous employment 
• Product introductions / withdrawals 
• Intended market for products 
• Price increases/reductions 
• Claimed accuracy, vocabulary size, speaker (in)dependence 
• Hiring of new CEO 
• Stated commercialization strategy 
• Acquisitions, liquidations, IPOs, industry exits 
• Funding events, including venture capital, government, and other sources 
• Lawsuits 
• Financial reports 
• Patent awards 
• Licensing deals 
The coding task above was distributed among the first author and multiple research assistants. Each RA 
was asked to code a year’s worth of newsletter data previously coded in order to calibrate accuracy. 
Coded fields were then sorted by firm and date in Excel, which was exported to Stata for analysis.  
 
Figure B1: ASR trade journal availability per year. All available issues were coded. 
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